This paper estimates the effect of sovereign debt renegotiation on international trade. Sovereign default may be associated with a subsequent decline in international trade either because creditors want to deter default by debtors, or because trade finance dries up after default. To estimate the effect, I use an empirical gravity model of bilateral trade and a large panel data set covering fifty years and more than 200 trading partners. The model controls for a host of factors that influence bilateral trade flows, including the incidence of International Monetary Fund programs. Using the dates of sovereign debt renegotiations conducted through the Paris Club as a proxy measure for sovereign default, I find that renegotiation is associated with an economically and statistically significant decline in bilateral trade between a debtor and its creditors. The decline in bilateral trade is approximately 8 percent a year and persists for about fifteen years.
I: Introduction
Why do countries pay their international debts? Three reasons are typically proposed.
First, countries that renege on their debts may have their overseas assets seized by foreign creditors. Second, countries with poor repayment reputations may be cut off from capital flows in the future. Third, delinquent countries may suffer reduced benefits of international trade.
While all three penalties are of interest, this paper is concerned with the last explanation. The first sanction is of limited potency for net debtors with little foreign collateral. A number of economists (most visibly Bulow and Rogoff) have disputed the importance of future exclusion from capital markets. The third explanation is widely accepted, but has never been quantified.
The objective of this paper is to estimate empirically the effect of sovereign debt renegotiations on international trade.
There are at least two reasons why international default may reduce trade in principle.
First, trade credit may naturally shrink after default. Alternatively, creditors may wish to punish default with reduced trade benefits, in order to discourage future default, or default by third parties. In practice, default seems to be strongly associated in practice with reduced trade. I use a large panel data set covering over 200 trading partners over fifty years of data to estimate a "gravity" model of trade. I show that debt renegotiation is associated with a decline in bilateral trade that is both economically and statistically significant, adding up to a year's worth of trade, although the effect is spread over fifteen years.
The next section presents a theoretical framework to frame the relationship between sovereign default and international trade, while the third section presents the institutional setting of sovereign default through debt renegotiations at the Paris Club. Next, the empirical methodology and data set are discussed. The actual empirical results are presented in the fifth section, which includes sensitivity analysis. The paper finishes with some suggestions for future work and a brief conclusion.
II: Why Might Sovereign Default Affect Trade?
There is a large literature on the issue of sovereign default; Eaton and Fernandez (1995) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chapter 6) provide recent surveys. However, little of it has been explicitly concerned with the interaction between default and trade. In this section, I provide a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis that follows.
There are two reasons why sovereign default could affect trade. The more interesting reason is that a creditor may want to discourage further default (either by the debtor in the future or by other debtors), with a punishing decline in trade. The more banal reason is that default may naturally result in a drying up of short-term trade credit, the vehicle used to finance most international trade. In practice, it is difficult and, for my purposes, unimportant, to differentiate between these explanations. I explore both briefly below.
Restriction of Trade as an Inducement for Debt Repayment
While the literature provides strong hints that restricted international trade can be used to encourage debt repayment, formal modeling is relatively rare. 
Trade Restrictions to Deter Default by Other Debtors 2
Suppose there are N + 1 countries, of which one is the creditor country and the other are borrowing countries. Trade between the creditor and debtor n generates surplus of 2T(X nt ) in period t if trade is unconstrained, where X nt is the economic state of n at time t. For convenience, assume the surplus is evenly divided between the creditor and the debtor. Each period, the borrow must repay d to the creditor (i.e., service its debt). If d is not repaid, then the creditor can restrict trade, reducing the surplus per country to k n T(X nt ), where 0 < k n < 1. The timing within a period is that debtors simultaneously decide to repay or not, then the creditor decides whether to take actions against delinquent debtors.
Assume that X nt is randomly and, for convenience, independently determined each period from an interval that we normalize to be [0,1]. Let S(X) be the survival function (one minus the distribution function). Assume T is an increasing function and that T(0) = 0. Let δ be the common discount factor. For convenience, assume all debtors are identical.
Consider the following strategies for the countries:
• Creditor: Provided it has maintained its reputation to punish, then, in the interactions with each debtor, set k n = 1 if repaid that period, otherwise set it to k n = k* < 1 (i.e., punish). If it has failed to maintain its reputation, then set k n = 1 regardless of repayment.
• Debtor: If the creditor has always punished non-repayers or there has yet to be an instance of non-repayment, then repay if T -d > k*T and default otherwise. If the creditor has ever failed to punish non-repayers, then default regardless of T.
If the creditor fails to punish, then the rest of the game is clearly subgame perfect: the creditor anticipates that it can not affect debtors' behavior, so there is no point to punishment, given that punishing also punishes the creditor. Without punishment, there is no motive to repay (and hence, no debt).
It is only required to verify that the strategies can be equilibrium strategies. If the debtor believes that the creditor will punish, then the strategy for the debtor is clearly rational. For the creditor, the question is whether to suffer the short-run cost of punishing to maintain its reputation. Let π denote that probability of repayment on the equilibrium path if the penalty is k*; that is,
Then the expected net present value of maintaining a reputation is
(Recall that the density over E is -dS.) The expected net present value after losing a reputation is
So the question is whether T(E) + V0 < k*T(E) + V, for all E < E*. This is equivalent to asking whether T(E*) + V0 < k*T(E*) + V, since T is an increasing function. It can be shown that if there exists a k* such that π > ½, then there is an N such that this inequality holds; that is, such that punishing is a credible threat.
Thus, the creditor uses trade restrictions to punish the defaulting country, and thereby deter default by other debtors.
Trade Restrictions to Deter Future Default by the Same Debtor
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An alternative reason why creditors may restrict trade is to deter future default by the same debtor. It is easy to analyze this phenomenon in a repeated game of loan repayment.
Suppose there are two players, a creditor and a debtor. Before the game in period 0, the creditor decides whether to make a loan to the debtor. Naturally a loan is not made if in the subsequent repayment game there is no equilibrium with repayment. In each period of the repayment game, the debtor chooses whether to service his debt ("Pay") or renegotiate the debt ("Default"). The creditor simultaneously chooses whether to engage in free international trade ("Trade") or to restrict trade ("Restrict").
The creditor prefers to be paid, the debtor prefers to default, and both prefer to trade freely. This can be depicted by the game, with payoffs for (Creditor, Debtor):
While the unique Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game is (Default,Trade), standard folk theorems (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986) imply that any feasible payoff pair that is individually rational (i.e., gives each player at least the minmax that they could guarantee themselves) is an equilibrium payoff of the infinitely repeated game with sufficiently players (i.e., discount rate δ close enough to 1). In this game the minmax is (0,0) and, in particular, (1,2) can be sustained by the carrot-stick equilibrium in which (Pay, Trade) is played along the equilibrium path and deviations are punished by playing (Default, Restrict) for an appropriate number of periods. 4 The drawback of such a model is that in equilibrium, no punishments should be observed.
In the spirit of Green and Porter (1984) one can therefore allow for imperfect observability (although of a different form). In particular consider a model with two states, Good and Bad, where it is very costly for the debtor to service debt in the bad state. The payoffs are as above, except that the debtor's payoffs when paying are reduced by some large M. The creditor cannot verify the state, although naturally the debtor observes the state. The state is independently drawn each period, where Good has a probability p in (p*,1). 5 The equilibrium above can be simply modified to be a perfect public equilibrium (Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin, 1994) in which punishments are observed along the equilibrium path. In particular, for appropriate values of δ<1, p*<1 and M, then the above will not be an equilibrium, since the debtor will default. Nevertheless, it will be equilibrium for the debtor to pay except in bad states, and to default in bad states. Default results in a single period of (Pay, Trade) followed by a punishment phase, which is a certain number of periods of (Default, Restrict). 6 Thus, the equilibrium path will involve intervals of (Pay, Trade), broken by a period of (Default, Trade) which is then punished by an interval of (Default, Restrict) and then either a return to (Pay, Trade) (with probability p) or, with probability (1-p) to another (Default, Trade), instigating another (Default, Restrict). 7 Thus, in this example the creditor uses trade restrictions to punish the defaulting country, and thereby deter future default by the debtor.
Default and Trade Credit
The two examples show that it is possible that trade restrictions can be used to punish and deter default. But a fall in trade after sovereign default need not be a deliberate overt act of retaliation. Indeed, as a result of sovereign default or risk creditor countries have never, to my knowledge, used formal legal sanctions. 8 Instead, any negative effect may be simply the result of the drying-up of short-term trade credit. 
Discussion
It is not necessary to argue that reduced international trade is the only deterrent to sovereign default; the "pure reputation" effects disputed by Bulow and Rogoff (1989a 
III: Sovereign Debt Renegotiation in Practice
In practice, it is rare for a country simply to default on (let alone repudiate) its international financial obligations. Instead, it typically renegotiates its debts, usually through the "Paris Club." In this section, I provide a brief overview of the debt renegotiation process. More information on the Paris Club is provided by , Eichengreen and Portes (1995) , and the website of the Paris Club. 14 The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors that meets approximately ten times a year to discuss issues associated with external debts of developing countries, and renegotiate these debts. 15 The Paris Club began with the 1956 renegotiation of Argentina's external debt, and has since reached over 335 agreements with over 75 debtor countries; these collectively total over $375 billion. The French Treasury provides a small secretariat for the club.
The Paris Club is informal and has no legal basis or status; instead it adheres to a set of principles. Three of the key principles are particularly germane. First, all decisions by creditors are taken by consensus, ensuring "creditor solidarity." Second, the Paris Club preserves "comparability of treatment" between all creditors. In particular, it is expected that Paris Club members, non-members, and private creditors (notably banks) be treated comparably by the debtor country, to ensure equitable burden sharing. The only exceptions are the international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank that are treated as preferred, though they are often expected to provide new money. Third, the Paris Club prefers that deals be negotiated only for countries that are engaged in an IMF-approved program, complete with appropriate conditionality.
The relationship with the IMF is important. An IMF program is a litmus test for "imminent default," and thus ensures that renegotiation is warranted. More importantly, an IMF program is a means to implementing the reforms required to resolve the underlying payments difficulties. Thus an IMF program usually precedes a Paris Club deal. But the dance is complicated, since the IMF typically agrees to a program only with the implicit assurance from the Paris Club that temporary debt relief from the creditors will be forthcoming, in order to ensure IMF repayment. 16 Paris Club agreements apply to public sector debt as well as private debt guaranteed by the public sector. 17 The debts considered are only those granted before a "cutoff date" which is not changed in subsequent negotiations; this division of debts is intended to help restoration of the flow of credit. It is important to note that only medium and long-term debts are rescheduled.
To quote the Paris Club: "Short term debt (debt with a maturity of one year or less) is excluded from the treatments, as their restructuring can create a significant disruption of the capacity of the debtor country to participate in international trade." However, while developing countries occasionally participate in the negotiations, the core members are large OECD countries. 19 In order to reduce the costs of renegotiation, only creditor countries with debts exceeding a small "de minimis" level negotiate (creditors sometimes participate as observers if their levels are lower than the de minimis level). Thus, participation varies with both the debtor and time. The Paris Club operates quickly in practice; negotiations begin soon after an IMF program begins and are typically concluded within six to eight months. 20 The Paris Club provides four different types of renegotiation. "Classic terms" include: five years of grace; semi-annual principal repayment terms in years six to ten; and a moratorium interest rate which is designed to keep the net present value of the debt intact. Three sets of additional terms have been made available more recently; all involve a grant element that reduces the net present value of the debt. "Toronto terms" were created in 1988 to facilitate debt reduction for very low-income countries. These were superceded in 1991 by "London terms" which were in turn replaced in 1994 by "Naples terms." "Houston terms" were created in 1990
for low-middle income countries. In 1996 the HIPC initiative (for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) became available under "Lyon Terms" which were subsequently modified to "Cologne terms". In this paper I use only "classic" Paris Club agreements, which account for the majority of all Paris Club deals. Since they do not involve any (intended) grant element, they are most appropriate in isolating any effects of debt renegotiations on trade. (It would be interesting to investigate Paris Club deals with a grant element, although the small sample size makes this a difficult endeavor at present).
Paris Club agreements seem to be the most appropriate dates for measuring sovereign default. The only potential alternative dating scheme would use the onset of arrears of international payments of interest, principal, or both. This seems an inferior measure. There were 283 Paris Club deals through 1997 (some of which were not "classic"), and 163 spells of arrears that together spanned some 2000 country-year observations. The overlap between the onset of arrears and Paris Club deals is poor, even within a year or two. While some of the arrears spells were clearly defaults, some were officially or quietly encouraged so that the arrears were strictly technical (e.g., between an IMF program and the conclusion of a Paris Club deal).
Further, arrears were rarely absolute; partial debt service was routinely continued during periods of arrears and was usually comparable to (or higher than) the size of arrears. This makes it difficult to measure the nature and scope of default simply though using the presence of arrears.
Further, arrears is a multilateral concept, whereas Paris Club information is available on a bilateral basis. For all these reasons, I use the dates of Paris Club deals to date sovereign debt renegotiation.
IV: Empirical Methodology and Data Estimation Strategy
I use a conventional gravity model to model bilateral trade flows, augmented with a number of extra controls: 
where i and j denotes countries, t denotes time, and the variables are defined as:
• X ijt denotes the average value of real bilateral trade between i and j at time t,
• Y is real GDP,
• Pop is population,
• D ij is the distance between i and j,
• Lang is a binary variable which is unity if i and j have a common language,
• Cont is a binary variable which is unity if i and j share a land border,
• FTA is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to the same regional trade agreement,
• Landl is the number of landlocked countries in the country-pair dyad (0, 1, or 2).
• Island is the number of island nations in the pair (0, 1, or 2),
• Area is the land mass of the country,
• ComCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 with the same colonizer,
• CurCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j are colonies at time t,
• Colony is a binary variable which is unity if i ever colonized j or vice versa,
• ComNat is a binary variable which is unity if i and j remained part of the same nation during the sample (e.g., France and Guadeloupe, or the UK and Bermuda),
• CU is a binary variable which is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t,
• IMF is one/two if one/both of i or/and j began an IMF program at t and zero otherwise,
• RENEG is a binary variable which is unity if i and j renegotiated international debt at time t and zero otherwise,
• K and M are unknown lag lengths,
• β are a set of nuisance coefficients, and
• ε represents the myriad other influences on bilateral trade, assumed to be well behaved.
The coefficients of interest to me are {φ}, the effect of current and lagged debt renegotiations on trade. I estimate the model with both fixed and random effects panel data estimators. The fixedeffects ("within") estimator is equivalent to adding a comprehensive set of (11,178) country pairspecific intercepts to the estimating equation. This ensures consistent estimation of φ under a wide range of circumstances, but may not be efficient. 21 GLS/random-effects ("variance components") can be more efficient, but is well known to be consistent in a more restricted set of circumstances.
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The Data Set
The trade data used in this paper is taken from the "Direction of Trade" data set developed in CD-ROM form by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ; the same data set is used by Glick and Rose (2002) . The data set covers bilateral trade between all 217 entities measured by the IMF between 1948 and 1997 (thought many observations are missing). Not all of the trading partners are "countries" in the conventional sense of the word; colonies (e.g., Bermuda), territories (e.g., Guam), overseas departments (e.g., Guadeloupe), countries that gained their independence (e.g., Guinea-Bissau), and so forth are all included. I use the term The Paris Club's website provides data on all agreements including: the date; the cutoff date; the type of treatment (Classic/Naples, etc.); the list of participating creditor and observer countries; the amount of debt treated; the current status of the agreement; and so forth. I use these data in order to construct my dummy variable for debt renegotiations, RENEG, which is unity in the year when a creditor-debtor pair was involved in a Paris Club deal and zero otherwise. 
V: Empirical Results
Benchmark Results
Benchmark results are reported in Table 1. In the middle of the table, I tabulate Above and beyond all these (mostly) conventional effects on bilateral trade, debt renegotiations seem to have a substantial negative effect on international trade. The effect is somewhat sensitive to the exact method of estimation; the fixed effects estimator indicates a decline of trade of about seven percent annually, while the GLS estimator shows a larger effect of nine percent. Both effects are highly persistent, lasting around fifteen years at more or less constant levels. While the individual φ coefficients are often statistically insignificant because of multicollinearity, the hypothesis that debt renegotiations have no effect on trade can be rejected at any reasonable significance level. Further, the cumulative effect of renegotiations on trade is also large negative and significant. The effect averages about eight percent annually and persists for about fifteen years. The two columns at the right of Table 1 show that these effects are not especially sensitive to the exact specification of the lag length; eliminating the lags of IMF program inception and dropping the last five renegotiation lags does not destroy the negative effect of debt renegotiation on trade.
Lag Length
The appropriate number of lags of debt renegotiation (M) is unknown. Does uncertainy about M affect any economic conclusions? No. Table 2 In passing, I note that adding one or two leads of Paris Club renegotiation has no effect on the economic or statistical significance of debt renegotiation; the leads themselves are insignificant. This provides further evidence that the Paris Club dates are appropriate dates for debt renegotiation.
Censoring, Simultaneity and Sensitivity Analysis
Trade is bounded below by zero, so a technique that takes this constraint into account may be preferable to my default estimators, which are both linear. Thus Table 3 presents a random-effects panel Tobit estimator. 33 Reassuringly, the results are quite similar to those of Table 1 (though they are considerably more computationally demanding).
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Debt renegotiation may be caused by shocks that also cause trade flows to shrink; that is, the estimation strategy may be biased because trade and debt renegotiation are simultaneously determined by some other factor that has been omitted from the statistical analysis. While Reassuringly, both fixed-and random-effects indicate that simultaneity bias is not responsible for the negative effect of renegotiation on trade; both the joint and the cumulatively negative effects remain significant. Nevertheless, the IV estimates are obtained only with a dramatic reduction in observations since the macroeconomic instrumental variables are missing for many of the original observations. 35 Further, the instrumental variables are poor in the sense that they deliver imprecise estimates; while Π m φ m and Σ m φ m remain negative and significant, the standard errors are much larger. Table 4 performs a variety of sensitivity experiments with respect to the sample. It reports probability-values for a key hypothesis, namely Π m φ m =0 ∀m, as well as the point estimate of Σ m φ m , along with an appropriate standard error. The statistics are reported for both fixed-and random-effects estimators for four different samples: 1) the default entire sample; 2) the sample without the 1990s; 3) the sample without African observations; and 4) the sample without Latin-American observations. All the evidence indicates that debt renegotiation has a statistically significant effect on trade, and that the cumulative effect is negative. For one of the perturbations (when the fixed effects estimator is used without the 1990s), the cumulative effect is negative but with a t-statistic of unity.
To summarize: the finding that debt renegotiation seems to affect trade aversely seems robust to uncertainty with respect to lag lengths, censoring, simultaneity, and the exact sample.
Trade Diversion
There seems to be evidence that countries which default engage in less bilateral trade with their creditors for a number of years after renegotiation. The costs of this reduced trade to the debtor may be alleviated if trade is merely diverted from creditor countries to others. Thus it is important to test for trade diversion after debt renegotiation.
I test for trade diversion by adding to the default equation, contemporaneous and lagged values of a dummy variable that is unity if (at least) one of the countries rescheduled its debt but the pair of countries was not directly involved in a renegotiation. For instance, Albania rescheduled debt with Austria in 1993, but not with Australia (since Australia is a permanent member of the Paris Club, this implies that its Albanian assets did not exceed the de minimis level). My variable "RENEG" is one for Albania-Austria in 1993, but zero for AlbaniaAustralia; my variable "DIVERT" is exactly the opposite. A positive coefficient for DIVERT indicates that (e.g., Albanian) trade is diverted away from creditors (e.g., Austria) towards noncreditors (e.g., Australia). Table 5 adds contemporaneous and lagged values of DIVERT. Independent of how many lags of DIVERT are included, its contemporaneous value has a significantly negative coefficient. Thus the trade of a debtor not only follows with its creditors at the time of renegotiation, it falls with other countries as well. But it is interesting to note that this negative effect is much less persistent than that of RESCHED. It turns positive within a couple of years using the fixed-effects estimator, and within five years using the random-effects estimator. The exact results are sensitive to both the estimator and the number of lags used, so that it is not possible to conclude with any confidence whether or not there has been any trade diversion. But it is clear that trade between debtors and non-creditors is not as dramatically affected by renegotiation as trade between debtors and creditors. 36 This pushes one towards the hypothesis that creditor countries are seeking to punish default, since trade credit might be expected to dry up uniformly.
Differential Effects on Exports and Imports
Thus far the analysis has focused on total bilateral trade between a pair of countries, rather than on exports and imports separately. But there is no reason why default need have the same effect on a defaulting country's exports and imports. I explore this possibility further in Table 6 . Table 6 is based on estimation of bilateral export flows, rather than total bilateral trade flows. Instead of using a single dummy variable to indicate a Paris Club deal that involved in the pair of countries (and fifteen of its lags), I include two variables (and their lags); one for default by the exporting country, and another for default by the importer. The other nuisance variables are included, and results are, as usual, reported for both fixed-and random-effects estimators.
The results indicate that Paris Club renegotiation has similar effects on both exporting and importing countries. As is clear from the first two rows, the joint effect of the contemporaneous and (fifteen) lagged coefficients of renegotiation on exports is highly statistically significant for both estimators, while the cumulative effect is economically and statistically large. The middle rows indicate that much the same effects characterize imports, though the cumulative effects are smaller. At the bottom, I test two hypotheses. The second line from the bottom is a test of the hypothesis that the joint effect on exports is equal to the joint effect of imports; that hypothesis cannot be rejected at standard significance levels. Still, the cumulative effect on exports is somewhat larger than the effect on imports, as is clear from the last line.
To summarize, the effects of default on exports seem somewhat higher than those on imports. Still, the most striking result is really that default has a substantive effect on trade. It would be interesting to extend this analysis to cover "London Club" negotiations between debtors and private sector banks. The primary obstacle to this lies in determining the default dates. London Club activity proceeds with a much longer lag than does the Paris Club, since the bank advisory committees require near or total unanimity from a more heterogeneous group than the Paris Club; Eichengreen and Portes (1995) provide more discussion.
I have not identified whether the effect of default on international trade appear because of a natural shrinking of trade finance or because creditors seek to punish and deter default. While both seem plausible, the evidence of trade diversion indirectly supports the punishment/deterrence theory. This is another natural project for future research. Probability value for hypothesis Πφ k =0.
Regressors not recorded include: Contemporaneous values of RENEG and IMF; currency union; log distance; real GDP; real GDP per capita; common language; border; regional FTA; landlocked; island; log area; common colonizer; current colony; ex-colony; common country; and intercept. Number of observations = 219,573 in 11,178 dyads. .00 -1.54 (.14) Probability values for "All RENEG=0;" coefficient values and standard error for ΣRENEG. Benchmark regression: Contemporaneous and 15 lags of RENEG; contemporaneous and 5 lags of IMF; currency union; log distance; real GDP; real GDP per capita; common language; border; regional FTA; landlocked; island; log area; common colonizer; current colony; ex-colony; common country; and intercept. Number of observations = 219,573 in 11,178 dyads. Regressors not reported: contemporaneous and 15 lags of RENEG; contemporaneous and 5 lags of IMF; currency union; log distance; real GDP; real GDP per capita; common language; border; regional FTA; landlocked; island; log area; common colonizer; current colony; ex-colony; common country; and intercept. Number of observations = 219,573 in 11,178 dyads. 
